One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime by Do, Quoc-Anh et al.
One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: 
Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime* 
QUOC-ANH DO†, KIEU-TRANG NGUYEN‡, AND ANH N. TRAN§ 
October 2013 
 
Abstract 
We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an 
exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate 
their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their patrilineal 
hometowns. Favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among 
officials without budget authority. Promotions of officials strongly 
improve hometown infrastructure including roads, marketplaces, 
and irrigation. In contrast to democracies’ pork-barrel politics, 
elected legislators are not influential. Favoritism is likely motivated 
by officials’ social preferences for hometowns rather than by 
political considerations, because favors are narrowly targeted to 
small communes, and are stronger where local culture emphasizes 
the family bond. 
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“One person becomes a mandarin,1 his whole clan benefits.” 
-  Vietnamese proverb 
“Even the blind favor the people they know.” 
-  Indian proverb 
“When a man gains power, his chicken and dogs all go to heaven.” 
-  Chinese proverb 
I. Introduction 
Studies of corruption, defined as officials’ and bureaucrats’ abuse of the 
privileges of public office for private gain, often consider such gains in terms of 
personal and family benefits. In other cases, the misuse of public office is 
manifest as favoritism towards certain associated groups. In democracies where 
there is electoral accountability for office holders, favoritism has often been 
studied in the form of pork-barrel politics, whereby politicians and officials direct 
resources to favor certain groups in order to win their votes and political support. 
This strategic quid-pro-quo behavior has been a central topic in the political 
economic literature, and is substantiated by a significant body of evidence (e.g. 
Ferejohn 1974, Shepsle and Weingast 1981). 
However, in authoritarian regimes where the state is barely accountable to 
voters, politicians gain power not via competitive elections. To get appointed to 
an office, they have an incentive to please their superiors rather than any group of 
citizens. This lack of electoral incentives opens up a number of questions 
regarding the political economy of autocracies. For example, do officials favor 
any group of citizens at all? Which parts of the political hierarchy can direct 
public resources towards favored groups, given that authority is highly 
concentrated in the hands of a few people at the top? How is such favoritism 
actually exercised? What are the motives of such favoritism when elections do not 
1
 The term “mandarin” refers to bureaucrats of the historical Vietnamese monarchist court. 
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matter? These questions have important implications for the design of anti-
corruption institutions. 
Our paper addresses these issues by examining the effects of public officials’ 
political promotions on public infrastructure in their hometowns in single-party 
Vietnam. The term “hometown” refers to each official’s commune of patrilineal 
origin. It is important culturally but not politically, since officials are by no means 
political representatives of their hometowns. We collect an extensive dataset of 
political promotions and estimate their effect on infrastructure in the hometowns 
of officials. We refer to it as favoritism, as this is a form of favors given by 
officials to their remote relatives regardless of merit. 
Most studies since Ferejohn’s (1974) seminal work explain patronage politics in 
democracies, particularly the political strategies to distribute pork in exchange for 
votes and political supports. Notable empirical evidence includes Levitt and 
Snyder (1995) in the U.S; Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Banerjee and 
Somanathan (2007), Keefer (2010) and Keefer and Khemani (2009) in India, and 
Hicken (2001) in Thailand. In addition, Besley, Pande and Rao (2012) shows that 
elected officials favor their own villages and castes, which in turn support them in 
elections.2 
In authoritarian regimes, where more than half of the world population are 
living, anecdotal examples abound of the excessive favors that dictators bestow 
on their hometowns. Sirte was a small and unknown village in Libya until the 
early 1970s when it suddenly received massive government investments, to 
become home of the Libyan parliament and most government departments 
relocated from Tripoli in 1988. The town was not chosen at random: it was the 
birthplace of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya’s autocrat for 42 years. In a similar vein, 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the dictatorial president of Côte d’Ivoire from 1960 
2
 Favoritism also relates to the burgeoning literature on the value of political connection through socio-economic 
relations, such as Khwaja and Mian (2005). 
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until his death in 1993, moved the official capital city from Abidjan to the ten-
times smaller town of Yamoussoukro, his birthplace, in 1983. The new capital 
received massive public investments, including the completion in 1989 of the 
$300-million Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro, constructed on an 
area even larger than that of St. Peter’s Basilica in Vatican City. 
A few recent studies have uncovered evidence of authoritarian patronage, all in 
the form of ethnic favoritism by African top autocrats. Burgess et al. (2013) and 
Kramon and Posner (2012) provide empirical evidence of favoritism towards 
common ethnic groups by top autocrats in Kenya. Under nondemocratic 
institutions, Kenyan presidents directed public resources disproportionately 
towards their ethnic groups to build roads (Burgess et al 2013) and improve 
education (Kramon and Posner 2012). After democratization, road construction 
favoritism disappeared, while education favoritism remained equally prevalent. In 
a similar vein, Franck and Rainer (2012) find that authoritarianism aggravates 
ethnic favoritism. 
Does patronage in authoritarian regimes go beyond ethnic lines? If so, which 
forms would it take in other contexts outside Africa where ethnicity does not play 
a prominent role? Ethnicity in Africa can be interpreted as a salient form of social 
proximity. In other cultures, social proximities can be more saliently manifested 
in relations defined by religions, families, hometowns, or classes. Similarly, does 
patronage exist below top leaders? If it does, whom do lower-ranked officials 
favor and why? To understand these aspects of nondemocratic politics, we need 
information on officials of different ranks in an authoritarian context where social 
proximity is not set rigidly along ethnic divides. 
Vietnam provides such a context. A single party, the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV), has ruled the country since 1975. It selects, controls and appoints 
positions in all political, executive and legislative bodies, and elections are in 
truth non-binding approval votes on the state (Malesky and Schuler 2009). 
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Government officials are thus accountable to the selectorate within the Party and 
are insulated from the population. The original Vietnamese ethnic (Kinh) 
constitutes 86% of the population of this ethnically homogenous society, and 
control most important political positions. 
In Vietnamese culture, the home commune of patrilineal origin is a significant 
part of each person’s identity, as it represents the traditional geographical root of a 
person’s patrilineage, in many cases up to hundreds of years in genealogical 
records. Social proximity exists among relatives from the same hometown even if 
they are genealogically four or five generations remote from one another. For 
high-ranked officials, those bonds are more likely of social rather than economic 
nature. Even among officials born in their hometowns,3 they must have moved 
away to cities early, and in any case no later than they ascended to positions at 
provincial level or higher (we only consider hometowns in rural area.) The 
widening gap between living standards in Vietnamese cities versus rural areas 
makes it unthinkable for successful officials to plan to retire in their hometown. 
Any affiliation between officials and hometowns likely originates from 
Vietnamese cultural and social norms. Such norms are captured by the old saying, 
“one person becomes a mandarin, his whole clan benefits.” 
Favoritism towards one’s hometown is widely known in Vietnam as the usual 
fruit of combined efforts of both high-ranked officials and local officers. 
Typically, a commune leader from a newly promoted official’s hometown starts 
the process by suggesting to the official certain projects that could benefit the 
commune, usually in the form of infrastructure construction. In most cases, these 
projects are not at all under the official’s authority. Nevertheless, the official can 
use his new political capital to influence province and district governments in 
decisions on the commune’s budget and project funding, in favor of such projects 
3
 We have verified that most members of the Politburo were either born in a different place, or left their hometown at a 
young age. Unfortunately, full biographical information is not available for all officials in our sample. 
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for his hometown. Due to the large amount of public investment in infrastructure 
at all levels during the last decade, this mechanism has become rampant, and has 
been constantly depicted on popular press. Both the public and the State regard 
this form of hometown favoritism as highly undesirable because it distorts public 
resource allocation. 
We examine the outcome of favoritism in public infrastructure in communes, 
given its key role in development. The United Nations regards infrastructure as 
one of the most important foundations for achieving its Millennium Development 
Goals. Shioji (2001) suggests that a 10% increase in infrastructure investment 
improves regional income by 1 to 1.5% in the long run. Fast-growing Vietnam 
and China invest nearly 10% of their national incomes in this critical foundation 
(Sahoo 2012).4 
In this empirical project, we collect data on all officials in ranking office during 
the period 2000-2010. Ranking officials include all members of the Party Central 
Committee, all government positions of the deputy minister rank and above, all 
provincial leaders and all members of the legislative National Assembly. We then 
match their hometowns to infrastructure data on communes, as surveyed by the 
Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS.) Our empirical strategy 
employs commune-official pair fixed effects and year dummies to eliminate 
endogeneity biases by time-invariant omitted variables. Further, we run placebo 
tests for the effect of officials’ promotions on communes neighboring their 
hometowns to ensure that there is no evidence for time-variant omitted variables 
and reverse causation. 
We focus on the commune, the lowest administrative level in Vietnam, to 
precisely capture hometown bonds. There are more than eleven thousand 
communes in the country, and each is home to only a few thousand people on 
4
 Interestingly, Persson and Zhuravskaya (2009) reports that Chinese provincial leaders who build their careers within 
the province tend spend less on infrastructure and more on education and health, which reflects local preferences. 
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average. Given their tiny size, no single commune can harness any significant 
level of political or popular support for a ranking official in provincial or national 
government. Because communes play no role in the political selection process, 
existing theories of clientelism would not predict politically motivated favoritism 
by officials. We further consider lower-level officials, whose political promotions 
depend solely on their superiors’ decisions and whose political survival has no 
relation to the recipients of favors (say, as supporters in an armed conflict.) 
Therefore, the Vietnamese context of officials’ home communes provides an ideal 
setting for mitigating concerns about strategic political behavior, leading to an the 
interpretation of favor as rooted in social preferences. 
Using this approach, we find strong evidence of favors addressed to officials’ 
hometowns across several types of infrastructure, most notably road access to 
villages and marketplace construction. Promotions also increase the chances that a 
commune will benefit from the State’s support for poor communes, through a 
program supposed to select communes purely based on their level of hardship. 
Favoritism is detected only for home communes and not for home districts, while 
even the latter is still too small a geographical unit to provide any significant 
political support. The effects hold even for the sample of very poor communes, 
where officials are most unlikely to retire or gain any economic benefits. This 
pattern suggests that the main motive of favoritism is a form of social preference 
directed towards each official’s hometown. 
The distribution of favoritism reveals the power structure within an 
authoritarian regime, a topic often considered a black box to outsiders. Contrary 
to pork-barrel politics in democracies, members of the legislative National 
Assembly do not have much influence on their hometowns’ budget, despite their 
formal role in budgetary approvals. In contrast, favoritism is pervasive among 
executive officials. The effect is stronger when the age of the hometown’s 
commune chair is closer to the official’s age, and where the provincial 
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institutional environment allows for more discretionary policies. These findings 
suggest that favoritism works through informal channels based on specific forms 
of political power and institutional settings. 
This finding also enriches the recently burgeoning literature on family culture 
and civic institutions. In his seminal study of a small village in Southern Italy, 
Edward Banfield (1958) pioneered the concept of amoral familism, by which 
strong family values could inhibit and hinder civic behaviors. This view posits 
that familism gives rise to corruption and fosters deviance from norms of merit. 
Measuring familism from World Values Survey data across countries, Lipset and 
Lenz (2000) shows strong association between familism and corruption, and 
Alesina and Giuliano (2011) provides empirical support that strong family ties 
imply lower civic engagement and political participation. In our specific context 
where Vietnamese officials bring material benefits to their hometowns, the 
influential Confucian values regarding patrilineal origins play a role similar to 
that of family ties in the aforementioned studies, in that they can be in conflict 
with good governance standards. We do find that favoritism is more pervasive in 
regions where the family and services to others are considered more important, as 
measured in the World Value Survey. 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections II to V present the political 
background of Vietnam, data description, testable hypotheses, methodology and 
empirical results, respectively. Section VI discusses the results and concludes. 
II. Context of the Study 
A. Political background 
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam states that, “the 
Communist Party of Vietnam […] is the leading force of the State and the 
Society.” In practice, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has held a 
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monopoly of power since Vietnam’s reunification in 1976. CPV members account 
for less than 4% of the population. In the Vietnamese political structure, the three 
most important bodies (by the order of actual power) are the CPV, the 
Government, and the National Assembly. The CPV is headed by a General 
Secretary, and its leadership includes a 15-member Politburo and a 150-member 
Central Committee. These are the most powerful people in Vietnam, in charge of 
making all key personnel and strategic decisions for the country. 
The Government, headed by a Prime Minister and several Deputy Prime 
Ministers, is the executive branch of the state. Functionally, the Government 
consists of more than 30 ministries and ministry-level agencies. The cabinet 
includes the State Bank’s Governor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s 
Court and the Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy.5  
Geographically, the Government includes 64 provincial authorities called 
Provincial People’s Committees. There are three levels of the local authorities: 
provincial, district and commune. The lower-level People’s Committees report to 
the higher-level People’s Committees. 
The National Assembly (NA) is the legislative branch of the state. It consists of 
roughly 500 delegates elected from electoral districts based in the 64 provinces. 
All laws and budget decisions are prepared by the Government before they are 
sent to the NA for discussion and ratification. In practice, the CPV controls all 
key positions in the NA, and runs the NA to rubberstamp most proposed laws. 
The CPV also closely controls the nomination and election process for the NA 
(those controlling practices are documented by Malesky and Schuler 2009). 
About 80% of the delegates are members of the CPV. Although the NA’s de facto 
power has increased in recent years, it is still very limited compared to that of the 
CPV and the Government. 
5
 The judiciary in Vietnam has limited power and depends heavily on the Government and CPV. 
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Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the ruling party selects, appoints, and 
influences the filling of all government and political positions. The nominal 
process is supposed to work as follows. In an election year, based on lists of 
nominations by the incumbent Politburo and Central Committee, the CPV’s 
Congress meet and select the Central Committee, which then selects the Politburo 
and ranking positions. The CPV then nominates candidates for the NA, including 
its key positions, and citizens vote among those candidates. Afterwards, elected 
delegates of the NA, 80% of whom are CPV members, vote to approve the Prime 
Minister and cabinet members nominated by the CPV in a single, uncontested list. 
Finally, the Prime Minister and Cabinet Members appoint all other positions in 
the Government. The CPV controls closely the selection of candidates, the 
communication between candidates and constituents, the election locations and 
procedure, and the counting of the votes. The CPV’s Central Committee 
effectively decides who fills ranking positions in the Central and Provincial 
Governments and in the NA. In this system, the popular votes count little, and 
small entities like communes hold no political power over ranking officials. 
Under Vietnam’s single-party rule, there is little separation between the State 
and the CPV, and thus little distinction between politicians and bureaucrats. In 
practice, starting from very low ranks, such as the heads of communes, officials in 
the Government need to be members of the CPV in order to hold office and get 
promotions. Ranking members of the CPV and elected delegates of the National 
Assembly receive their salaries from the same system and source as do 
government bureaucrats. 
It is useful to understand the ways in which Vietnamese government officials 
may direct public investments in infrastructure toward their preferred communes. 
Subject to the level of funding required, the decision to build public infrastructure 
is made in different stages by provincial, district and then commune officials. 
These are the officials who can directly favor projects for certain communes. 
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Officials at the central level, such as members of the Central Committee of the 
CPV, of the Government Cabinet or of the National Assembly, usually do not 
have the formal, hierarchical authority to make decisions on local infrastructure. 
They must exercise their personal influence on local officials, who have the 
authority in this matter, in order to obtain government projects for their preferred 
communes. The only exception to this is Program 135, the State's "poor commune 
support program" which aims to promote the development of especially difficult 
communes by, among other things, investing in commune infrastructure. The 
selection of "‘especially difficult communes"’ is made by the Central Government 
under the advice of a joint committee of several related ministries. 
During the study period, Vietnam experienced significant economic growth and 
a drastic reduction in poverty. Real GDP increased by 6.5% per year on average 
from 2001 to 2010. The percentage of people living on less than two dollars (PPP) 
per day fell from 68.7% in 2002 to 38.5% in 2008.6 The government’s budget, 
while always in deficit, was strongly supported by the growing economy, strong 
exports (thanks particularly to revenue from crude oil) and development aids. 
Consequently, the government expanded all forms of infrastructure construction, 
including in particular those in communes and districts, an attempt widely seen as 
instrumental for poverty alleviation. This period therefore holds particular interest 
for a study of a determinant of infrastructure in rural Vietnam. 
B. Cultural and social background 
Culture is known as an important informal institution that sanctions political 
and economic behaviors (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, Tabellini 2010). The 
phenomenon of strong connections among extended families is a cultural norm 
not unique to Vietnam. The importance of kinship networks in both traditional 
6
 World Bank, World Data Bank, accessed August 8, 2011 
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and post-traditional societies has been long studied inter alia by Radcliffe-Brown 
(1922) and Mitchell (1965). The diverse ways in which these networks exhibit 
and operate across different societies have attracted more recent studies. For 
example, Angelucci et al. (2012) have stressed the importance to informal 
insurance of social networks based on the extended family in rural Mexico. The 
literature on social networks also identifies family links as a key factor in job 
searches (see Ioannides and Loury’s 2004 review).  
In our context, the family links manifested in the form of connections to a 
hometown are a strong point of reference in Vietnamese culture. In their 
traditionally heavily patriarchal society, rooted in a long history of Confucian 
influences and a cult of ancestral worship, social norms put particular emphasis 
on patrilineal links in the family and society (Hunt 2002). Since Confucius, filial 
virtues, mostly defined within a patriarchal family, have been considered the 
building blocks of a stable society. Therefore, all links based on common 
patriarchal roots are sacred and command great respect. It is quite common to 
observe large loans and transfers within the extended patrilineal family, and 
especially contributions towards “public goods” such as religious ceremonies and 
ancestral temples that help glorify common patrilineal ancestors. 
The hometown, defined as the origin of a person’s patrilineal clan, is thus truly 
important to most Vietnamese. It highlights a person’s connection to his or her 
extended patrilineal family, composed of all those who share one’s patrilineal 
ancestors (Nguyen and Healy 2006). Bonds are easily forged among people of 
common hometown even if they are genealogically many generations remote 
from each other. Hometowns are so important that this information figures in all 
national identity cards, while there is no information on place of birth. 
In the traditional Vietnamese Confucian culture, government officials resemble 
the successful mandarins of the old days. Historically, the selection, promotion 
and ascent to power of mandarins were heralded with major celebrations in their 
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hometowns. Once selected, mandarins would usually try to direct favors to their 
hometowns in acknowledgment of the benevolent blessings they must have 
received from their ancestors, and in sustaining the tradition of filial virtues. 
Anecdotal evidence points out that these practices are still very common today. 
The Vietnamese context thus opens the door to our study of the role of officials’ 
social preferences towards their hometowns. The connections between individuals 
and their hometowns are prevalent and important according to the existing social 
norms. They are also distinct from political motivations, since hometowns are of 
negligible political importance. Moreover, because of the long wars in Vietnam, 
most ranking officials must have either been born far away from their hometown, 
or have moved away at a young age as part of waves of war refugee migrants in 
both the North and the South; they also must be at present based in a large city 
away from their rural hometowns. Therefore, officials’ links with their 
hometowns are mostly based on cultural and social factors. 
III. The Data 
A. Data collection 
As in most authoritarian countries, data on officials and their family backgrounds 
in Vietnam are scarce. Available information is highly scattered and skewed 
toward top officials, leading to potential selection issues. Our question requires 
data on the full population of ranking officials, which makes data collection more 
difficult. From 2009 to 2011, our data collection team identified, checked and 
matched officials from three major sources: the Communist Party’s information 
on all members of the Politburo and Central Committee (which is publicly 
available on its websites), the National Assembly’s (the legislature) information 
on all of its members (also publicly available on its website) and the Yearbooks of 
Administrative Organizations’ information on Central and Provincial Government 
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officials starting from the rank of deputy minister (Central Government) and vice 
chair of Provincial People’s Committees (Provincial Government). These are the 
three major political bodies of Vietnamese politics. The sources cover the period 
from 2000 to 2010; start and end dates are based on official term dates. In 
practice, start and end dates that differ from term dates (e.g. an early promotion) 
are unusual. This puts together an exhaustive dataset of all ranking political 
promotions in the country during this 11-year period. 
Since important officials typically hold more than one position in these 
organizations, we make sure to match all individuals across the three groups, if 
necessary by obtaining extra information from other sources. We pay special 
attention to clarifying information on each official’s hometown, understood as the 
commune of patrilineal origin in the Vietnamese legal context. This legally 
defined information appears, for example, on individual’s identity cards, and 
needs not correspond to one’s birthplace. In the very few cases in which different 
hometowns are listed in different sources, we include all verifiable hometowns in 
the dataset. We exclude officials whose hometowns cannot be traced to the 
commune level (even when they are traceable to the district level). 
Official data on commune budget are not available in Vietnam. Fortunately, 
data on local infrastructures and public goods can be obtained from the Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS, a World Bank-led survey project in 
Vietnam, part of the Living Standards Measurement Surveys.) The survey is 
technically supported by the World Bank, and regarded as the most reliable data 
on living standards in the country. The VHLSS, which includes a commune 
survey and a household survey, is conducted every two years (2002, 2004, 2006 
and 2008) from a random, representative sample of about 2200 communes out of 
about 11,000 communes in the country. The commune survey is conducted with 
several commune officials, while the household survey is conducted with a 
random sample of households in the commune. Our analysis exploits data from 
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both surveys, including commune characteristics (i.e. area, population, average 
income, average expenditure, geographical zone, rural/urban classification), 
presence and quality of various types of infrastructure in the communes (i.e. 
roads, marketplaces, utilities, irrigation systems, schools, clinics/hospitals, 
cultural centers, radio stations, bank branches) and commune chairman 
characteristics (i.e. age, gender, education, years in position, previous position). 
We then match each official to his or her commune of patrilineal origin. Only 
rural communes are included so as to avoid the complexity of infrastructure 
development in urban areas. We exclude the top 4 positions in the country, 
namely the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the President, 
the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the National Assembly, to focus on the 
pervasiveness of favoritism beyond the top. This results in a sample of 422 
officials and 351 communes, out of 1,791 officials in the collected three sources. 
These 422 officials hold a total of 678 positions, consisting of 119 positions 
(17.6%) in the Party Central Committee, 102 positions (15.0%) in the Central 
Government, 290 positions (42.8%) in the National Assembly and 167 positions 
(24.6%) in Provincial People’s Committees. All 60 Vietnamese provinces, 
excluding the 3 major cities, are covered in this sample. 
From those matches, we construct our main sample, in which each observation 
combines an official, his rural home commune and a year for which this commune 
figures in the VHLSS (2002, 2004, 2006 or 2008). We include communes that are 
connected to at least one official in this period. This main sample consists of 
1,542 observations, relatively evenly distributed over the years (376, 393, 398 and 
375 observations for 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008, respectively). 
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B. Data description 
Table 1 summarizes data patterns. In Panel A, we describe politicians in the 
matched sample as well as the full collected dataset of politicians. Given that 
VHLSS covers only a random sample of all communes in the country, we can 
match roughly one quarter of collected politicians to communes available in the 
VHLSS. This proportion is around 20% for Central and Provincial Governments, 
for which our data source contains more missing data in terms of hometown: 30% 
for the National Assembly and 35% for the Party’s Central Committee. This is 
approximately the coverage rate of VHLSS for rural communes, which we are 
interested in. (The VHLSS oversamples rural areas compared to urban areas.) 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
As discussed, this period is marked by the inflation of key positions in 
Vietnamese politics. The size of the Central Committee increased by 26.4% 
between 2002 and 2007, from 148 to 187 (starting from an even lower number in 
its 8th term), an expansion that was matched by the number of Central 
Government positions (46.9%, from 128 in 1997-2002 to 188 in 2003-2007). In 
contrast, the size of the National Assembly was reduced from 499 in 2003-2007 to 
456 in 2008-2011. Most members of the Central Committee hold more than one 
key position as counted in our data; the majority of them hold at least 3. 
Meanwhile, the majority of the legislature members do not hold any other key 
position. Across the matched and total samples, we see roughly similar shares of 
different types of positions.  
Among those that have at least one connection as shown in Panel A, there are 
roughly two positions connected to each commune. Panel B further shows that on 
average each commune has 1.2 politicians in office throughout the 2000-2010 
period. The survey waves of 2004 and 2008 witnessed the majority of promotions, 
corresponding to new terms of the Central Committee in 2007, the Government 
15 
 
(starting in 2003-2004) and most strongly, the National Assembly (starting in 
2003 and 2007). These waves are therefore largely responsible for the 
identification in our regressions. Our empirical strategy uses a measure of power 
capital, understood as the accumulated number of positions connected to a 
commune, regardless of whether a politician remains in that position. Panel B 
shows that power capital accumulates fastest for the National Assembly and more 
slowly for Government and Central Committee positions. On the other hand, the 
coverage of our sample is fairly stable over time in terms of administrative units 
(commune, district or province), area and population. We observe a stark increase 
in the share of good-quality roads, suggestive that the effect of promotions will be 
most remarkable for road quality. 
Communes with connections to politicians are different from the full VHLSS 
sample in a number of ways. The former are smaller in area, but more densely 
populated and less likely to be poor. When it comes to basic infrastructure, they 
are on average better endowed with good-quality roads, marketplaces and radio 
stations, consistent with the findings on favoritism. Given the concern of selection 
bias in the group of communes connected to at least one politician, our empirical 
strategy remains conservative insofar as it only uses the sample of matched 
communes, and aims to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. 
IV. Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Design 
A. Testable predictions 
Given the Vietnamese political context, where most ranking officials are not 
personally involved in district-level budget decisions, favors must be brokered 
between each official and the local budget allocator. The official is endowed with 
great political capital thanks to his high rank, and cares about the welfare of his 
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hometown. The budget allocator wants political help from the ranking official, in 
return of infrastructure investment in the official’s hometown. 
We will spell out three key testable hypotheses, derived from a formal model 
available in the online appendix. Under the negotiated deal, the official could 
influence infrastructure in his hometown. Given little accountability and checks 
on officials, we first expect testable Hypothesis I: hometown favoritism is 
widespread among officials. 
Second, since the negotiation outcome depends on the official’s power and the 
budget allocator’s discretion in allocating infrastructure projects, we should find 
evidence supporting Hypothesis II: hometown favoritism depends positively on 
the official’s rank in the authoritarian hierarchy and on the home province’s 
discretionary power. 
Third, favoritism should be most present when most valued by the official, i.e. 
when the hometown bonds of the official are strongest. Hypothesis III thus states 
that favoritism decreases as we move from the home commune to neighboring 
communes or to the home district. Furthermore, it is stronger when local culture 
puts more value on family ties and support. 
B. Empirical Design 
We investigate the effect of officials on hometowns by matching all ranking 
officials in our database to their home communes if included in the VHLSS, and 
regress commune infrastructure indicators on the official’s power indicator. Each 
observation represents an official-commune pair in a specific year. 
Since the link between communes and officials is potentially influenced by 
several omitted unobservable factors, endogeneity biases may arise in several 
ways. Certain static factors, such as a province’s richness and power, may 
correlate with better infrastructure and education, and also the capacity to produce 
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more high-ranked officials. Other potential time-variant factors may influence 
promotions and local infrastructure as well. Good provincial performances may 
reward officials with promotions, and accelerate infrastructure improvements.  
We deal with static sources of endogeneity by including location-specific fixed 
effects to absorb all time-invariant omitted factors. The fixed-effect specification 
implies that we are identifying the effect of promotions on improvements of 
infrastructure. We also include commune-official pair fixed effects to control for 
time-invariant factors that exert influence on both officials’ promotion and their 
preferences towards hometowns. For instance, this fixed effect can correct the 
downward bias introduced when practical officials care less about hometowns but 
get promoted more frequently. 
Regarding rewards for performances, a dynamic source of endogeneity, we 
should note that officials in our sample are not directly responsible for the 
performances of home communes, as explained in section II. Given their high 
ranks, even if their immediately preceding positions had been in local 
governments, they must have been at provincial level. Therefore, if such time-
variant factors are driving the results, we must be able to detect similar effects in 
neighboring communes in the same province. We thus perform “placebo tests” 
that can potentially confirm or refute our causal interpretation by using 
infrastructure in communes in the same district as the outcome. Other placebo 
tests also explore leads of the explanatory variables in the regressions, for which 
we predict that local infrastructure improvements do not precede promotions. 
Given those considerations, our benchmark regression is the following: 
Infrastructurecpt = βPowerCapitalp,t-L +γXcpt + δt + δcp + εcpt. 
The indices c, p, and t respectively represent the home commune c of official p in 
year t. L denotes the possible lag after a promotion. Commune-level 
Infrastructure indicates either the quality of roads to villages, or the presence of 
local radio stations, preschools and schools, irrigation, water systems, or 
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marketplaces. The vector Xcpt regroups observable controls, which include 
population size, average income, and a dummy for five different geographical 
zones. The fixed effects by year and by commune-official pair are respectively 
denoted as δt and δcp; and εcpt is the error term. The sample includes all rural 
commune-official matched pairs, spanned over the whole period 2000-2010. 
The right-hand-side variable PowerCapital adds up all ranking positions ever 
held by each official until year t-L. The fixed-effect specification using this 
measure thus estimates the impact of a change in PowerCapital, i.e. an official’s 
move to a new position, while it ignores the eventual departure from previous 
offices. In Vietnam, while the ascension to a new position is a significant change, 
leaving a ranking position before retirement mostly means a switch to another, 
usually more important one. It does not prevent the official from having strong 
influence on his previous office, even in the case of retirement. In one recent case, 
for instance, a former Minister of Education had relinquished that position to 
become Deputy Prime Minister; however, he still exerted particularly strong 
influence on the Ministry of Education. In other words, the relative importance of 
an official in the government is best measured by the accumulation of the 
important, ranking positions he has held over time. 
The estimate of β in this framework is interpreted as the treatment effect 
averaged over all officials for whom we observe a new ranking position (a change 
in Power Capital) during the considered period. The fixed effects control all time-
invariant factors of the pair commune-official, including geographical conditions 
of the commune (distance to large cities, major rivers etc.), background conditions 
of the official (gender, education, etc.), year of participation in the ruling party 
and year of first-ranking position. The year-fixed effect further dilutes concerns 
about macroeconomic changes that could affect both new promotions and 
infrastructure construction. 
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V. Empirical results 
We employ this benchmark empirical strategy to different data subsamples to 
address the following questions: (i) Does favoritism arise in an authoritarian 
regime? (ii) Who is powerful in the political hierarchy? and (iii) What is the 
motive of favoritism? These questions correspond to Hypotheses I, II and III 
discussed in Section IV.A. We report the results for each question below. 
A. Does favoritism arise in an authoritarian regime? 
More precisely, we ask if officials other than top leaders exercise favoritism in an 
authoritarian regime. We first present our estimations of the impacts of an 
official's promotion to a ranking position on the construction of various types of 
infrastructure in his rural home commune in Table 2, using the main sample 
discussed in Section III, which excludes the top leaders (General Secretary of the 
CPV, President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Assembly). We 
find strong positive effects on several outcomes, some with a lag, including the 
construction of local radio stations and the improvement of local roads within a 
year of the promotion, the construction of preschools and irrigation systems, the 
introduction of clean water access with a one-year lag and the construction of 
commune marketplaces with a two-year lag. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The effects are immediate for the construction of local radio stations and the 
improvement of local roads. As shown in column (1), a native official's new 
promotion increases the probability of having a local radio station by an estimated 
3.5 percentage points. Column (2) shows a similar effect of 6.2 percentage points 
on local road quality. Road access quality is measured for a village randomly 
sampled in the commune, so this result is interpreted as the impact of an official’s 
promotion on the proportion of villages with higher-grade road access. 
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A new promotion affects other outcome variables with lags. With a one-year 
lag, we find positive impacts of the promotion on the presence of preschools and 
irrigation systems as well as clean water access, as presented in columns (3) to 
(5). The effects are 2.5 percentage points, significant at 10%; 6.4 percentage 
points, significant at 10% and 4.9 percentage points, significant at 5%, 
respectively. With a two-year lag, there is strong evidence of impact on the 
presence of commune marketplaces, with an estimate of 5.9 percentage points at 
5% significance. The different lags observed for different outcome variables are 
consistent with the time required for clearing the land for different types of 
infrastructure. Establishments of local radio station and quality improvements of 
existing village roads can be easily completed within one year because they do 
not require land clearance, a lengthy and frequently controversial process in 
Vietnam. All other types of infrastructure require land clearance and take more 
time to build. Marketplaces require particularly more time because they are 
usually located in populated areas and require relocation of many households. 
The main sample used in Panel A includes communes where some types of 
infrastructure were already present at the beginning and throughout the period 
from 2002 to 2008. Excluding these communes from the main sample with 
respect to each type of infrastructure gives us a more informative estimate of the 
impact of an official's new promotion on the construction of the respective type of 
infrastructure in his rural home commune. Panel B of Table 2 reports the 
benchmark regression results using such refined samples. 
Not only do the estimates derived from these refined samples remain 
statistically significant despite much smaller sample sizes (with the exception of 
pre-school construction), they are also expectedly much larger than those derived 
from the main sample reported in Panel A. The estimated impact on local road 
quality increases from 6.2 percentage points in Panel A to 9.3 percentage points in 
Panel B. For local radio stations, it increases from 3.5 to 16.1; irrigation systems − 
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6.5 to 12.6, clean water access − 4.9 to 8.9; commune marketplaces − 5.9 to 12.6; 
and the preschools estimate soars to 31.8% (imprecisely estimated). These 
differences reflect the fact that many infrastructures are already in place at the 
beginning of the period in the main sample used for Panel A; therefore, the actual 
impact on the probability of getting each new infrastructure (with lag) can be as 
large as 10% or even higher. 
The results presented in both panels of Table 2 are consistent with the claim of 
widespread favoritism among Vietnamese officials, shown in the form of newly 
bestowed infrastructure projects in their home communes. Given that our sample 
does not include top leaders, this finding provides support for Hypothesis I (non-
top officials in authoritarian regimes also exercise favoritism.) 
Table 3 reports further checks on the effect of an official's new promotion on 
other types of outcome variables, including commune average income, 
expenditure and population, all with a one-year lag, and the immediate inclusion 
into the State's “poor commune support program,” controlling for year, zone and 
commune-official or province fixed effects. Column (1) reports the effect on 
aggregate infrastructure in the home commune, calculated as the total number of 
existing infrastructure items as surveyed by the VHLSS (detailed in data 
appendix.) The estimate is 0.202, significant at 5%, suggesting that the promotion 
increases the probability of any new infrastructure construction by as much as 
20.2 percentage points. Column (2) shows that the promotion has a significant 
effect of 1.7 percentage points on the commune’s inclusion into the State’s “poor 
commune support program,” while, interestingly, the commune average income – 
the key criterion established by the law – does not even predict such inclusion. In 
other words, the official’s promotion improves the hometown’s chance of 
benefiting immediately from the program, in line with the centralized nature of 
the program as discussed in Section II. However, columns (3) and (4) show that 
there is no evidence that an official's new promotion improves (or reduces) his 
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rural home commune’s living standards in terms of its average income and 
expenditure. Both estimates are less than 1 percentage point and not statistically 
significant. Similarly, the promotion does not affect the commune population as 
presented in column (5). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
For robustness checks, we explore alternative specifications using different 
controls, different fixed effects, different lags and different observation units for 
two key outcome variables: local road quality and the presence of commune 
marketplaces. These are arguably the two most important variables to economic 
development in communes. Table 4 summarizes this exercise. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Panel A of Table 4, we explore the effect of a native official's promotion on 
local road quality (detailed in the data appendix) under various specifications. 
Column (1) shows the benchmark specification with immediate effect, controlling 
for commune average income and population, as well as year, zone and 
commune-official fixed effects as presented in Table 2. Columns (2) to (4) verify 
the robustness of the results with different controls, including no fixed effect, 
year-fixed effect only and commune-official fixed effect only. Columns (5) to (7) 
vary the time lag from a year before the promotion to two years after. Column (5) 
runs a placebo test that includes Power Capital at one year after the year of 
observation of infrastructure: before the year of the promotion, we should not 
expect a positive effect on the outcome. Results from column (5) pass this test, as 
the coefficient of the 1-year forward value of Power Capital is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Columns (6) and (7) use Power Capital at one 
and two year(s) before the year of observation (its one-year and two-year lag 
values.) The result with a one-year lag is significant at 10%, while the result with 
a two-year lag is not, suggesting that the improvement in local road quality 
happens mostly in the immediate time window after the promotion. 
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In our benchmark regressions, the unit of observation is a combination of an 
official, his home commune and a year. In columns (8) and (9) we use other 
observation units to verify that the results are not driven by over-weighting or 
under-weighting certain communes. Column (8) uses a finer observation unit by 
combining a position (an official can have multiple ranking positions), the 
corresponding home commune and a year. Column (9) uses a coarser observation 
unit of a commune in a year, with the treatment variable Power Capital adding up 
all ranking positions accumulated by all officials coming from that commune. The 
impact estimates using these observation units are very close to the benchmark 
estimate, and statistically significant at 5%. 
We employ similar robustness checks for the outcome variable, commune 
marketplaces, in Panel B of Table 4. Column (1) shows the benchmark 
specification with a two-year lag and the full set of controls. Columns (2) to (4) 
test the results with different controls and show that the effect on marketplaces is 
robustly significant. Columns (5) to (7) vary the time lag from one year forward 
to a two-year lag. There is no evidence of effect in any of these columns, 
suggesting that the tendency of commune marketplaces to be constructed a few 
years after promotions is due to their relatively larger scale of construction. 
Columns (8) and (9) use alternative observation units. The coefficients in columns 
(2) to (4) and (8) to (9) are close to the benchmark estimate, even when some are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels due to small sample sizes. 
One may worry that the evidence thus far arises from the official’s better 
information on the targeted commune, which prompts the budget allocator to 
allocate more resources to that commune. This alternative explanation is a strong 
argument against most findings regarding favoritism and pork-barrel politics (e.g. 
Kramon and Posner 2012.) In our context, this story is inconsistent with several 
details. First, better information should have been shared independently of the 
official’s power, and thus before his promotion. Many officials in the sample had 
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already held some ranking positions, and could have well transferred their 
information. Because we find no effect prior to promotion, information sharing is 
unlikely to be the cause behind the effect on infrastructure. Second, most officials 
had not lived in their hometowns for an extended period, so the amount of 
information available to them that could improve the efficiency of public 
investments in those hometowns is unlikely to be better than that of local budget 
allocators. Third, infrastructure projects in our analysis are widely considered 
necessary in all communes, so further knowledge of local conditions is unlikely to 
affect the decision to undertake such constructions. Finally, we do not find that 
promotions have negative effects on other types of public infrastructure, 
suggesting this is unlikely about reallocation of resources across different 
infrastructures. 
B. Who has the power to give favors? 
Next we investigate the pervasiveness and degree of favoritism among different 
groups of Vietnamese officials, including members of the National Assembly, 
Central Government and Provincial Government. While existing literature on 
favoritism in autocratic regimes has mostly addressed top-level officials, who 
have both the political interest and the power to favor certain groups within the 
population (e.g. Burgess et al 2013), our sample covers not only the very few at 
the top but also a large number of mid-level officials. This investigation helps 
shed light onto the power structure of different groups of Vietnamese political 
elites, as shown in Table 5. Columns (2)-(8) compare the effects of an official's 
new promotion on home commune road quality, one of the two key outcome 
variables,7 using the benchmark regression in subsamples of non-chaired, all, 
7
 We also ran similar tests using the presence of commune marketplaces. The results from these tests are qualitatively 
similar to those presented above. 
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non-National Assembly positions, Central Government positions, Provincial 
Government positions and some combinations of these subsamples. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In democracies, members of parliament are the key players in pork-barrel 
politics (Shepsle and Weingast 1981, Bickers and Stein 2000). In authoritarian 
regimes, members of parliament may play a different role since the Central 
Government and ruling party make major decisions (Malesky, Schuler and Tran 
2012). In Vietnam, a regular, non-chaired member of the National Assembly 
without another ranking position in the CPV or Government can hardly use his 
parliamentary membership as leverage for any real benefits. Column (2) shows 
that an official's new promotion to such a non-chaired position in the National 
Assembly has no detectable effect on his home commune road quality. Even 
when we extend this subsample to all National Assembly positions in column (3), 
the impact estimate is still negligible. On the contrary, in the subsample of non-
National Assembly positions in column (4), which includes all remaining Central 
Government, Provincial Government and Party’s Central Committee positions, 
we find a large impact estimate of 10.0 percentage points, significant at 1%. This 
difference in statistical significance level is not driven by sample sizes, as the 
number of observations in columns (2)-(4) are roughly even. Overall, these results 
are consistent with our view that the parliament has little power within the 
Vietnamese political hierarchy and therefore its members have limited bargaining 
power to redirect resources to their hometowns. 
Columns (5)-(7) report the effect of an official's new promotion on his 
commune road quality in a subsample of Central Government positions, a 
subsample of Provincial Government positions and the combined subsample. All 
three point estimates are large, being 17.3, 8.2, and 9.3 percentage points, 
respectively, compared to the benchmark estimate of 6.2 percentage points. 
Furthermore, we find that a promotion to a Central Government position has a 
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larger and statistically stronger impact on home-commune road quality than a 
promotion to a Provincial Government position (17.3 compared to 8.2 percentage 
points), even though provincial leaders have direct control over budgetary 
allocations to communes. This result suggests the existence of an informal 
channel of influence through exchanges of personal favors (i.e. between a Central 
Government member and a local leader in this context) as described in our 
theoretical model, and the considerable political power of the Central Government 
that allows it to affect public decisions beyond its jurisdiction. 
Finally, column (8) reports the effect of an official's new promotion on his 
commune road quality in the subsample of "middle-ranking" positions. We ask if 
the effects of an official's new promotion on his commune road quality found in 
columns (4)-(7) are largely driven by only a few top-level officials, or if the 
observed hometown favoritism is much more pervasive among Vietnamese 
political elites. To do so, we construct a subsample of "middle-ranking" positions, 
which excludes not only the top 4 positions as in the benchmark sample but also 
all Deputy Prime Ministers, Vice Presidents, members of the Politburo and chair-
holding members of the Central Committee. The estimate of impact on 
improvement in local road quality in this subsample is 7.2 percentage points and 
significant at 5%. Although this estimate is, as expected, lower than that of 9.3 
percentage points in the subsample of all non-National Assembly positions, it 
provides clear evidence that favoritism is not limited to only top-level officials, as 
shown in the existing literature, but is pervasive also in the midrange of 
Vietnamese politics. 
Together, the results from Table 5 show that hometown favoritism is a 
phenomenon widespread across different groups and ranks of Vietnamese 
officials, consistent with Hypothesis I. The magnitude of such favoritism varies 
substantially among different ranks and divisions within the government, 
consistent with Hypothesis II. In particular, we find that even Provincial 
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Government officials are more powerful than members of the legislative National 
Assembly. Central Government officials, who have no authority over commune 
budget, turn out to be the most powerful in directing these public resources 
toward their hometowns. This pattern underlines the importance of informal 
authority and the inconsequence of legislative bodies in less democratic countries. 
We now ask which institutional environments are more likely to encourage or 
prohibit the sort of favoritism discussed above, using a measure of provincial 
governance. As we discussed in section IV.A, favor in the form of hometown 
infrastructure is likely negotiated between ranking officials and district budget 
allocators. Consequently, when local budget allocators have more flexibility in 
crafting policies, they can better commit to and honor quid-pro-quo deals with 
ranking officials, in order to channel resources toward their hometown budgets. 
We test this hypothesis with the use of provincial governance indicators taken 
from the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Indices (PCI), a set of survey-based 
indices of industries’ governance perceptions that has been systematically 
constructed with the help from the UNDP since 2006 (see details in Malesky 
(2006) and subsequent reports.) Among the available indicators, we select three 
that are relevant to the discretionary power of provincial leadership, including the 
index of provincial leadership proactiveness, the index of the lack of informal 
costs to business and the transparency score of the province. We synthesize a 
composite measure of provincial discretionary policies, abbreviated as PDP, as 
the proactiveness score minus the score on lack of informal costs, minus the 
transparency score, and take its average over the period of 2006 to 2008, the 
period during which the PCI overlaps with our sample. As in previous 
subsections, the sample is divided at the median of the PDP scores. Table 6 
reports benchmark regression results for the two subsamples. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Panels A and B of Table 6 present the benchmark regression results with 
subsamples of communes in provinces with above-median PDP scores (i.e. where 
provincial leaderships have more discretionary power) and those with below-
median PDP scores, respectively. The effects of a native official’s promotion on 
two key outcome variables – local road quality and presence of commune 
marketplaces – in each subsample as shown in columns (2) and (6) of each panel 
confirm our hypothesis that more flexible provincial institutional environments 
better allow ranking officials to influence new infrastructure construction in their 
home communes. In the subsample with higher PDP scores, the estimates for road 
quality and marketplaces are both large (7.1 and 8.5 percentage points, 
respectively) and significant (at 5%), while in the other subsample, the effects are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. These results suggest that 
discretionary authority facilitates favoritism. 
C. What is the motive of hometown favoritism? 
In existing studies of political favoritism, the identification of the motive of 
favoritism represents a formidable challenge. Officials may favor friends and 
relatives because of their social preferences for their kin, or strategic calculations 
in building and profiting from a political base. For instance, pork-barrel politics 
are mostly explained in terms of rewards to political constituencies, and ethnic 
favoritism by certain dictators arguably serves to build a coalition of support 
(Padro-i-Miquel 2007). In our context, we assess the relative importance of these 
two motives by comparing favoritism at the commune and the district levels. 
Political versus non-political motives: As argued in Proposition 3, moving from 
the commune to the district dilutes the social preference motive, since the larger 
population is less related to its officials. In contrast, the political motive is 
reinforced because a larger district can leverage greater political support for its 
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officials. We thus test for the political support mechanism by replicating the set of 
benchmark regressions on samples that match ranking officials to their home 
districts instead of their home communes. Table 7 summarizes the results from 
this exercise. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Each observation used in Panel A of Table 7 combines a ranking official, his 
home district and a year for which VHLSS data for at least one commune in that 
district are available. The value of each outcome variable at the district level is 
then calculated as the average among all the surveyed communes in the district. 
The resulted estimates are all well below 1 percentage point and are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. They thus refute the explanation 
that ranking officials grant favors to their home districts in exchange for political 
support at the local level. In Panel B of Table 7, we estimate the impact of an 
official's new promotion on infrastructure construction in non-home communes in 
his home district, using a sample in which each observation combines a ranking 
official, a non-home commune in his home district and a year for which VHLSS 
data for the commune are available. Again, all the resulting estimates are close to 
zero and not statistically significant. They suggest that the observed favoritism is 
driven by officials' social preferences toward their hometowns rather than by their 
desires for political support. This is consistent with Hypothesis III. 
We may ask whether an official's non-political motive is the result of economic 
calculations. For example, if the official owns property in his home commune and 
intends to retire there, it will be in his economic interest to provide the commune 
with better infrastructure. This explanation, however, is unlikely to hold for the 
poorest, most underdeveloped group of rural communes in Vietnam, where basic 
services and infrastructures are lacking, and the value of land is trivial. Indeed, it 
is extremely unlikely that retired officials would move away from the capital and 
big cities where their families have been enjoying high living standards to a 
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remote, backward place with poor schools, no hospital and only rural jobs in the 
foreseeable future. Table 8 summarizes the main regression results using this 
subsample of communes where income is poorer than the sample’s median. Most 
of the coefficients reported are statistically significant and comparable to the 
benchmarks. That the effects exist even for the poorer home communes suggests 
that economic self-interest is not the driving force of favoritism. Instead, an 
official is likely driven by his social preference toward his hometown, either for 
social recognition or by his own altruism. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Connection: If favoritism is based on the preference of ranking officials, we 
should expect that the social distance between the official and his rural home 
commune determines the magnitude of favoritism. We use the age gap between 
the official and the commune chairperson as a proxy for social proximity, as 
people with similar ages tend to go to school at the same time, communicate with 
each other better and build stronger bonds.8 In Table 9, we report the results from 
the benchmark regressions with subsamples divided according to the age gap 
between the official and his home commune's chairperson, using the sample 
median of a 10-year age gap as the division threshold. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Panels A and B of Table 8 present the benchmark regression results for the 
subsamples of communes where the age gap is below and above 10 years, 
respectively. Panel A shows that a commune benefits greatly from a native 
official's promotion when the commune chairperson and the official are of the 
same generation: the estimate for improvement in local road quality is 10.0 
percentage points, significant at 1%, and that for commune marketplaces is 6.1%, 
though not statistically significant due to small sample size. All coefficients in 
8
 VHLSS is fortunately one among the very few surveys of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
that includes information on commune officials. 
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Panel A are considerably larger than their counterparts in Panel B, where the 
commune chairperson is not of the same generation as the official. In fact, the 
only significant effect in Panel B is that of local road quality, but even that effect 
is only two thirds of the corresponding effect found in Panel A. The evidence 
suggests that commune chairs play an active role in the mechanism at work, and 
all the more so when they are closer to the promoted native officials. 
Cultural values: We further investigate whether favoritism is associated with 
related cultural characteristics of the hometowns, in particular the level of 
altruism directed towards the extended patrilineal family. In light of the 
explanation that officials’ favoritism is chiefly motivated by their social 
preferences towards their patrilineal origin, we expect higher levels of favoritism 
in areas where the local culture emphasizes altruistic deeds and family values, 
because officials are more likely to share those values, and under family pressure 
to act accordingly. To measure those cultural traits, we construct a family value 
index (FVI) by summing the answers to two questions in the World Value 
Survey’s wave 4, 2001: the importance of the family, and of services to others 
(detailed in the online appendix.) Table 10 presents the benchmark regression 
results in the subsamples of high versus low FVIs. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Panel A shows a strong effect of a native official’s promotion on local road 
quality in high FVI regions – at 9.7 percentage points – while that in low FVI 
regions is only 2.3 percentage points. We find similar patterns for the presence of 
radio stations (immediate), preschools and irrigations (one-year lagged); while the 
results for marketplaces are not distinguishable between the two samples. Overall, 
the evidence suggests that favoritism is more prominent in regions that place more 
value on altruism and the family. 
Commune needs: If favoritism is principally motivated by an official’s social 
preferences for his hometown, we expect the effect to be declining in the 
32 
 
commune’s average income, as the official is less willing to give to his wealthier 
relatives. This decline should be similar for the two key infrastructures in our 
paper, measured as local road quality and presence of commune marketplaces. On 
the other hand, one may expect the benefits per capita of a marketplace to be 
increasing in the population size, thanks to the economies of scale of such a 
service. Therefore, the effect on marketplace construction is expected to be 
increasing in the commune population size. Since the economies of scale are 
much less clear in the case of village roads, we need not expect a relationship 
between the effect on local road quality and the commune population size. 
We investigate the relationship between the favoritism effect and a commune’s 
baseline variable denoted as xc, namely average income or population size, by 
modifying the specification in section IV.B to allow for potentially heterogeneous 
effects of officials’ promotion on infrastructure improvements: 
Infrastructurecpt = β(xc)PowerCapitalp,t-L + γ(xc)Xcpt + δt(xc) + δcp(xc) + εcpt. 
We estimate the function β(xc) using semiparametric local linear regressions of 
the benchmark specification, and plot it against xc in Figure 1 (detailed in online 
appendix.) 
Figure 1’s top plots report the variations of favoritism according to average 
income for local road quality (left) and presence of commune marketplaces 
(right). Both plots clearly show a sharp drop in favoritism at a certain level of 
income, consistent with the explanation regarding social preferences directed 
towards hometowns in need. The bottom plots show the analogous variations 
according to population size. While it is hard to recognize a trend in the effect for 
local road quality, we can see clearly the increasing effect for the presence of 
commune marketplaces for the most important range of values of population size. 
The findings from these figures support our explanation regarding the directed 
social preference motive of government officials. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we attempt to show a causal link between the promotion of 
officials to ranking positions in high office and infrastructure developments in 
their home communes. Using a fixed-effect model on panel data of commune 
infrastructure, we find evidence of widespread favoritism in the construction of 
different types of infrastructure including roads, marketplaces, irrigation, schools, 
radio stations, safe water access and access to the State’s “poor commune support 
program.” The magnitude of favoritism depends on the position of the official, the 
respective provincial environment, the connection between the official and his 
rural home commune, and the local cultural importance of helping one’s family. 
While middle-ranking officials in the Government have significant ability to 
exercise favoritism, non-chair members of the legislative National Assembly do 
not. This power difference is in stark contrast to the politics that we have known 
in democracies. Further, ranking officials without formal, hierarchical authority 
over local budgets can evidently direct resources to their hometown budgets, 
suggesting that favoritism is exercised through informal influence. Communes 
better connected to promoted native officials and in provinces where provincial 
leaderships have more discretionary power tend to reap more benefits from 
favoritism. 
We observe that officials target their favors narrowly to their small home 
communes instead of distributing them over their whole home districts. The entire 
population of a commune is politically negligible in the Vietnamese context, and 
unlikely to matter to the official’s career. It is thus improbable that the findings 
are due to reverse causation or to strategic behaviors in building political support 
bases. We also use year- and commune-official fixed effects to eliminate concerns 
of time-invariant unobservable factors affecting both the promotion and the 
outcomes. Therefore, the results suggest a form of social preference towards 
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social relatives that prevails in environments with low transparency, high 
discretionary power on the part of local officials and a strong social connection 
between ranking officials and their relatives along social lines such as ethnicity, 
race, clan or geographic origins. 
The important question of efficiency has been left out in this paper, as it is in 
most related studies. It is not exactly clear how the favoritism pattern identified 
here affects the efficient allocation of public resources, an issue discussed by 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Apart from the intuitive interpretation that it could 
cause serious misallocations of public resources, one might also speculate that 
officials possess better information about their home communes and therefore can 
direct public resources to more efficient use in them. This information channel 
presents a formidable challenge to the broad literature on favoritism and 
patronage politics. Testing this efficiency gain or loss represents an interesting 
avenue for future research. In our study, it is unlikely that favoritism leads to a 
more efficient use of resources. Even if promoted officials know their communes’ 
needs, it is unlikely that they do better than local budget authorities in suggesting 
more efficient allocation. Besides, were it to exist, their information advantage 
should have materialized even before the promotion, and should have spilled over 
to neighboring communes as well. These two predictions are not supported by our 
empirical results; however, we remain cautious in making claims about efficiency. 
In the context of Vietnam, the relevant social preferences towards social 
relatives are closely linked with Confucian values that stress filial virtues and 
affinity to patrilineal origins. The paper has shown that variations in those values 
can predict the measured favoritism, and hints that certain cultural and traditional 
norms can be at odds with modern governance standards. It is thus different from 
ethnic-based favoritism, as evidenced from Africa, which could also arise as 
strategic behaviors to gather political support from same-ethnic recipients of favor 
(Burgess et al 2013, Padro-i-Miquel 2007). It remains an open question for future 
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research whether social preferences or strategic behaviors are more important in 
explaining favoritism across the world. 
Standard economic theory would predict that marginal incentives for corruption 
for personal gains will diminish as office holders become richer. It implies that in 
the long run, growth and stable politics will reduce corruption rates. Our results 
challenge this view. Because of their willingness to abuse power to channel public 
resources to social connections, ranking officials may maintain an appetite for 
corruption far beyond their own consumption and accumulation of wealth. This 
motive of favoritism runs independently of quid-pro-quo political support, and 
could thus be present in developed countries as well (Hyytinen, Lundberg and 
Toivanen 2007), although in such cases political concerns would confound the 
empirical association between power and favoritism. Socially motivated 
favoritism should be an important consideration in designing measures against 
corrupt behaviors on the part of public officials, not only in authoritarian regimes 
but also in countries where democracy and transparency are less than perfect. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Ranking officials 
Official group/subgroup Start year End year No. of officials No. of positions* 
Average** 
no. of 
positions 
Median** 
no. of 
positions 
No. of communes 
Central Committee 2002 2011 90 21% 119 18% 2.67 2 86 25% 
  Central Committee 9th 2002 2006 43 10% 43 6% 3.14 3 43 12% 
  Central Committee 10th 2007 2011 76 18% 76 11% 2.82 3 72 21% 
                      
Central Government 1997 2011 72 17% 102 15% 2.29 2 68 19% 
  Government from 2000 yearbook 1997 2002 23 5% 23 3% 2.65 2 23 7% 
  Government from 2004 yearbook 2003 2007 43 10% 43 6% 2.47 2 42 12% 
  Government from 2009 yearbook 2008 2011 36 9% 36 5% 2.56 2 36 10% 
                      
Provincial Government 2000 2010 105 25% 167 25% 1.92 2 97 28% 
  Government from 2000 yearbook 2000 2004 37 9% 37 5% 2.65 3 37 11% 
  Government from 2004 yearbook 2004 2006 67 16% 67 10% 2.19 2 64 18% 
  Government from 2009 yearbook 2006 2010 63 15% 63 9% 1.92 2 61 17% 
                      
National Assembly 2003 2011 252 60% 290 43% 1.58 1 224 64% 
  National Assembly 11 2008 2007 138 33% 138 20% 1.83 1 130 37% 
  National Assembly 12 2008 2011 152 36% 152 22% 1.70 1 144 41% 
                      
Total 1997 2011 422 100% 678 100% 1.61 1 351 100% 
Panel B. Communes 
Commune statistics 
Benchmark sample VHLSS rural commune population 
2002 2004 2006 2008 Overall 2002 2004 2006 2008 Overall 
Sample coverage                     
  Number of communes 311 323 328 309 343 2213 2238 2276 2191 2554 
  Number of districts 196 207 208 197 215 556 570 575 582 610 
  Number of provinces 55 59 59 57 60 55 59 59 57 60 
Commune statistics                     
  Average area 26.9 27.0 26.7 29.0 27.4 39.4 35.9 39.7 41.3 39.1 
  Average population 9794 9689 9658 9714 9713 9039 8631 8647 8836 8787 
  Average annual PC income ('000 VND) 4848 5220 6864 10272 6780 4104 5184 6888 10572 6672 
  % with poverty classification 13.2 13.7 14.0 12.6 13.4 19.2 20.9 19.4 18.0 19.4 
Commune existing infrastructure                     
  % with radio station - 81.7 86.9 85.4 84.7 - 77.0 80.7 80.6 79.5 
  % with good quality road 50.8 67.8 73.2 76.7 67.2 43.3 58.5 63.9 69.6 58.9 
  % with preschool - 96.9 98.8 97.4 97.7 - 96.8 96.4 97.7 97.0 
  % with irrigation system - 70.2 70.1 68.5 69.6 - 66.5 67.3 67.2 67.0 
  % with clean water supply 61.4 58.8 58.3 58.0 59.1 61.6 60.8 59.4 61.6 60.8 
  % with market place - 70.0 70.7 68.3 69.7 - 62.2 63.6 62.9 62.9 
Average politicians per commune                     
  promoted this year or the year before 0.13 0.69 0.18 0.63   - - - -   
  promoted/in office this year or earlier 0.29 0.77 0.83 1.21   - - - -   
  promoted/in office between 2000-10 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.21 - - - - - 
Average power capital per commune* 0.32 1.03 1.21 1.96 1.13 - - - - - 
  from Central Committee positions 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.18 - - - - - 
  from Central Government positions 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.19 - - - - - 
  from Provincial Government positions 0.11 0.32 0.49 0.49 0.35 - - - - - 
  from National Assembly positions 0.00 0.40 0.39 0.82 0.40 - - - - - 
 Note:                     
* Numbers of unique officials & numbers of positions x terms in each group/subgroup (each subgroup represents term) 
** Average/median numbers of positions x terms held by an official in each group/subgroup throughout the 2000-10 period 
*** Power capital of a commune in a year is the accumulated number of positions x terms held by officials coming from that commune up to that year 
Table 2. Officials' power and home commune infrastructure 
Panel A. Main sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0346 0.0620 0.0247 0.0643 0.0485 0.0590 
  [0.0201]* [0.0242]** [0.0127]* [0.0356]* [0.0197]** [0.0239]** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,155 1,533 1,157 1,155 1,528 1,157 
R-squared 0.738 0.578 0.575 0.587 0.726 0.772 
              
Panel B. Subsamples, excluding communes that already have corresponding infrastructure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean Water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.161 0.0932 0.318 0.126 0.0886 0.126 
  [0.0885]* [0.0373]** [0.309] [0.0650]* [0.0363]** [0.0563]** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 289 895 59 620 856 473 
R-squared 0.463 0.426 0.413 0.322 0.441 0.449 
Note: In this table, we estimate the impact of an official's new promotion to a ranking position on the construction of each type of 
infrastructure in his/her home commune by relating the number of ranking positions accumulated by the official to the presence of each 
infrastructure in the commune, using different lags, controlling for commune current average income per capita and population size, and 
including year, zone, and commune x official fixed effects. Panel A reports salient results for each different lag on the main sample. Panel B 
replicates the Panel A regressions on a subsample excluding communes where the corresponding infrastructure was present throughout the 
period. Panel B reports similar salient results from these subsamples. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune x year level. 
Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%).  
Table 3: Favoritism in other home commune outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Time lag 1-year lag Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 
Dependent variable 
 
Aggregate 
infrastructure 
Poor commune 
support program 
Commune 
average income 
Commune 
average expenditure 
Commune 
population 
            
Power Capital 0.202 0.0169 0.0106 -0.00438 -0.00526 
  [0.0881]** [0.00833]** [0.0275] [0.0188] [0.00733] 
Commune controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE   Yes       
Observations 1,148 1,532 1,542 1,542 1,533 
R-squared 0.769 0.434 0.688 0.779 0.953 
Note: This table reports further checks on the effect of a native official's new promotion on other type of outcome variables, including 
commune average income, expenditure, population, inclusion into the State's "poor commune support program", and aggregate infrastructure, 
most with a one-year lag and controlling for year, zone, and commune x official or province fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 control for current 
average income per capita and population size. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune x year level. Statistical 
significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%).  
Table 4: Alternative specifications and robustness checks
Panel A: Robustness checks with dependent variable Good Road
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time lag Immediate Immediate Immediate Immediate 1-year forward 1-year lag 2-year lag Immediate Immediate
Specification Benchmark No FE Year FE Com-Official FE Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Com-Position unit Commune unit
Power Capital 0.0620 0.0673 0.0213 0.146 0.0126 0.0426 0.0367 0.0563 0.0523
[0.0242]** [0.0125]*** [0.0136] [0.0181]*** [0.0248] [0.0245]* [0.0266] [0.0237]** [0.0214]**
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune x Position FE Yes
Commune FE Yes
Observations 1,533 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,533 1,533 1,533 2,480 1,262
R-squared 0.578 0.018 0.049 0.563 0.576 0.577 0.576 0.570 0.579
Panel B: Robustness checks with dependent variable Marketplace
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Time lag 2-year lag 2-year lag 2-year lag 2-year lag 1-year forward Immediate 1-year lag 2-year lag 2-year lag
Specification Benchmark No FE Year FE Com-Official FE Benchmark Benchmark Benchmark Com-position unit Commune unit
Power Capital 0.0590 0.0252 0.0353 0.00949 -0.0163 -0.0287 0.0284 0.0483 0.0326
[0.0239]** [0.0176] [0.0189]* [0.0188] [0.0271] [0.0272] [0.0233] [0.0195]** [0.0217]
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune x Position FE Yes
Commune FE Yes
Observations 1,157 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,870 951
R-squared 0.772 0.002 0.004 0.765 0.771 0.771 0.771 0.765 0.778
Note: Panel A explores the effect of a native official's new promotion on local Good road under various specifications, including using different controls and fixed effects, with different lags, and using different
observation units. Panel B explores the effect of a native politician's new promotion on presence of commune Marketplaces under various specifications, including using different controls and fixed effects, with
different lags, and using different observation units. Commune controls include current average income per capita and population size. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune x year level.
Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%).
Table 6. Favoritism by the flexibility of the provincial institutional environment 
Panel A. Subsample of communes in provinces with above-median PDP scores 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0629 0.0710 0.0226 0.0762 0.0474 0.0853 
  [0.0311]** [0.0319]** [0.0216] [0.0536] [0.0281]* [0.0379]** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 606 798 608 607 793 608 
R-squared 0.705 0.581 0.535 0.560 0.657 0.768 
Panel B. Subsample of communes in provinces with below-median PDP scores 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.00858 0.0496 0.0226 0.0626 0.0500 0.0342 
  [0.0262] [0.0364] [0.0158] [0.0484] [0.0279]* [0.0297] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 549 735 549 548 735 549 
R-squared 0.781 0.592 0.625 0.639 0.790 0.785 
Note: In this table, Panel A reports the benchmark regression results for the subsample of communes in provinces where provincial 
leaderships have more discretionary power, as measured by the Provincial Discretionary Policies' scores (PDP). Panel B reports the 
benchmark regression results for the subsample of communes in provinces where provincial leaderships have less discretionary power, as 
measured by the provinces' PDP scores. Commune controls include current average income per capita and population size. Robust standard 
errors in brackets are clustered at commune x year level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 5: Favoritism by different level of real budget authority 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Subsample Benchmark 
Non-chaired 
National 
Assembly 
All 
National 
Assembly 
Non 
National 
Assembly 
Central 
Government 
Provincial 
Government 
Central & 
Provincial 
Government 
Medium-
ranking 
                  
Power Capital 0.0620 0.0189 0.0281 0.1 0.173 0.0824 0.0930 0.0715 
  [0.0242]** [0.0471] [0.0467] [0.0333]*** [0.0792]** [0.0597] [0.0441]** [0.0358]** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  
Observations 1,533 861 904 829 267 393 648 832 
R-squared 0.578 0.582 0.574 0.602 0.558 0.602 0.579 0.582 
Note: This table reports benchmark regression results for key outcome variable Good Road using subsamples divided by different groups of 
Vietnamese political elites, including non-chaired National Assembly positions, all National Assembly positions, non-National Assembly 
positions, Central Government positions, Provincial Governments positions, and medium-ranking positions (i.e. ministers, deputy ministers, 
and the equivalent, provincial leaders, and ordinary members of the Central Committee). Commune controls include current average income 
per capita and population size. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune-year level. Statistical significance is denoted by 
*** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%).  
Table 7. Favoritism for home district 
Panel A. Sample in which ranking officials are matched to their home districts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital -0.00568 0.00351 -0.00001 0.00335 0.00634 0.00300 
  [0.00649] [0.00718] [0.00503] [0.0127] [0.00817] [0.00889] 
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 3,972 5,270 3,972 3,972 5,271 3,972 
R-squared 0.827 0.715 0.568 0.702 0.790 0.782 
  
Panel B. Sample in which ranking officials are matched to other communes in their home districts  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital -0.00571 0.00731 0.00292 0.00998 -0.00213 -0.00222 
  [0.00500] [0.00666] [0.00390] [0.00955] [0.00537] [0.00711] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 17,620 23,548 17,632 17,605 23,535 17,632 
R-squared 0.714 0.577 0.514 0.621 0.729 0.768 
Note: In this table, Panel A reports the benchmark regression results using a sample in which each observation combines a ranking official, 
his/her home district, and a year. The outcome variables are calculated as the average over the surveyed communes in that district. These 
regressions estimate the impact of an official's new promotion on infrastructure construction in his/her home district. Panel B reports the 
benchmark regression results using a sample in which each observation combines a ranking official, a commune in his/her home district that is 
not his/her home commune, and a year. These regressions estimate the impact of an official’s new promotion on infrastructure construction in 
other communes in his/her home district. Controls include current average income per capita and population size. Robust standard errors in 
brackets are clustered at commune x year level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%).  
Table 8. Favoritism within subsample of communes with below-median average household income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0826 0.0621 0.0174 0.0964 0.0340 0.0842 
  [0.0346]** [0.0339]* [0.0178] [0.0564]* [0.0242] [0.0372]** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 569 761 570 569 760 570 
R-squared 0.727  0.611  0.574  0.610  0.753  0.732  
Note: This table reports the benchmark regression results for the subsample of communes with below-median average household income, as 
measured in 2002. Commune controls include current average income per capita and population size. Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered at commune x year level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 9. Favoritism by age gaps between ranking officials and home communes' chairs 
Panel A. Subsample of ranking officials and home communes' chairs whose age gaps are below median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0427 0.101 0.0160 0.0673 0.0411 0.0608 
  [0.03] [0.0372]*** [0.0155] [0.0551] [0.0265] [0.0441] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 561 778 561 561 775 561 
R-squared 0.836 0.662 0.636 0.667 0.784 0.801 
  
Panel B. Subsample of ranking officials and home communes' chairs whose age gaps are above median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0122 0.0679 0.0197 0.0446 0.0438 -0.000900 
  [0.0278] [0.0379]* [0.0248] [0.0634] [0.0388] [0.0411] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 594 755 596 594 753 596 
R-squared 0.779 0.645 0.637 0.656 0.765 0.818 
Note: In this table, Panel A reports the benchmark regression results for the subsample of ranking officials who are more likely to have close 
relationships with their home communes' leaderships, as measured by the age gaps between the officials and their home communes' chairs 
(i.e., age gaps of 9 and below). Panel B reports the benchmark regression results for the subsample of raking officials who are less likely to 
have close relationships with their home communes' leaderships, as measured by the age gaps between the officials and their home communes' 
chairs  (i.e., age gaps of 10 and above). Commune controls include current average income per capita and population size. Robust standard 
errors in brackets are clustered at commune x year level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 10. Favoritism by family values 
Panel A. Subsample of communes regions with above-median family value index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0495 0.0969 0.0318 0.105 0.0293 0.0567 
  [0.0283]* [0.0344]*** [0.0145]** [0.0540]* [0.0235] [0.0393] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 544 723 544 544 722 544 
R-squared 0.705  0.588  0.347  0.587  0.741  0.773  
  
Panel B. Subsample of communes regions with below-median family value index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time lag Immediate Immediate 1-year lag 1-year lag 1-year lag 2-year lag 
Dependent variable Radio station Good Road Preschool Irrigation Clean water Marketplace 
              
Power Capital 0.0266 0.0233 0.0174 0.0320 0.0670 0.0545 
  [0.0281] [0.0349] [0.0194] [0.0464] [0.0305]** [0.0299]* 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune x Official FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 611 810 613 611 806 613 
R-squared 0.772  0.576  0.619  0.588  0.709  0.775  
Note: In this table, Panel A reports the benchmark regression results for the subsample of ranking officials coming from regions with above-
median family value index (FVI), defined as the sum of World Value Survey answers on the importance of family ties and services to others 
(higher FVI means more important). These regions are Red River Delta, North East, and North Central. Panel B reports the benchmark 
regression results for the subsample of ranking officials coming from the remaining regions, which have below-median FVI. Commune 
controls include current average income per capita and population size. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune x year 
level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Figure 1. Effects of a native official's new promotion by commune household income and commune population in 2002
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One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: 
Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime* 
QUOC-ANH DO, KIEU-TRANG NGUYEN, AND ANH N. TRAN 
Online Appendix Not Intended for Publication 
I. Data Appendix 
This appendix describes the data, sources, and variables used in "One Mandarin 
Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," 
(Do, Nguyen and Tran). 
Data on Ranking Officials 
We collect data on four groups of ranking officials: (1) Communist Party's 
Central Committee members, (2) Central Government officials, (3) Provincial 
Government officials, and (4) National Assembly's members. For each official, 
we record his position, its begin and end years, his year of birth, and the commune 
of his patrilineal hometown. One official can appear multiple times in the dataset 
if he held multiple positions or the same position in multiple terms during the 
period from 2000 to 2010. 
Data on Central Committee members come from the official website of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam <http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/index_e.html>. The 
data cover all members of the 9th Central Committee (2002-2006) and the 10th 
Central Committee (2007-2011). 
Data on Central and Provincial Government officials come from the 2000's, 
2004's, and 2009's Yearbooks of Administrative Organizations, published by the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs. The data cover all officials starting from the rank of 
deputy minister (Central Government) and vice chair of Provincial People's 
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Committees (Provincial Government). However, we only include Provincial 
Government officials whose patrilineal hometowns are in the same provinces as 
their positions. These officials represent 70% of total Provincial Government 
officials.       
Data on National Assembly members come from the Vietnam National 
Assembly's official website <http://www.na.gov.vn/htx/English/C1330/ 
#0TwLzt4Nw9UO>. The data cover all members of the 11th National Assembly 
(2003-2007) and the 12th National Assembly (2007-2011). 
Finally, we exclude 4 top positions in the country from the dataset to focus on 
the pervasiveness of favoritism beyond the top. These 4 positions are the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the President, the Prime Minister, 
and the Chairman of the National Assembly. For a subsample of "middle-ranking" 
positions, we further exclude all Deputy Prime Ministers, Vice Presidents, 
members of the Politburo and chair-holding members of the Central Committee. 
Power Capital 
Total number of ranking positions (excluding the above 4 top positions) held by 
an official connected to a commune (in commune-level regressions) or a district 
(in district-level regressions) between 2000 and the year of the observation. An 
official is considered connected to a commune (district) if his patrilineal origin is 
in the commune (district). In Vietnam, a person’s patrilineal origin is legally 
recorded, shown on the identity card, and needs not correspond to his birthplace 
or residence. 
Commune Characteristics and Infrastructures 
We obtain data on commune characteristics and infrastructures from the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). The VHLSS, technically 
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supported by the World Bank, is conducted every two years (2002, 2004, 2006, 
and 2008) at both commune and household levels from a random, representative 
sample of about 2,200 communes out of about 11,000 communes in the country. 
The commune survey is conducted with several commune officials, while the 
household survey is conducted with a random sample of households in the 
commune.  
We extract data from both surveys, including commune characteristics (i.e. 
area, population, average household income, average household expenditure, 
geographical zone, rural/urban classification), presence and quality of various 
types of infrastructure in the communes (i.e. roads, marketplaces, utilities, 
irrigation systems, schools, clinics/hospitals, cultural centers, radio stations, bank 
branches) and commune chairman characteristics (i.e. age, gender, education, 
years in position, previous positions). 
Finally, we only keep communes classified as rural in the dataset, so as to avoid 
the complexity of infrastructure development in urban areas. 
Radio Station 
Binary indicator of the presence of a radio station in the commune in the year of 
observation. Data are available for 2004, 2006, and 2008. 
Good Road 
Binary indicator of better road access (i.e. asphalt or concrete roads) to a 
randomly selected village in the commune in the year of observation. Data are 
available for 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. When it is used as dependent variable, 
the result could be interpreted as impact on the proportion of villages with good 
road access in the commune. 
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Preschool 
Binary indicator of the presence of a preschool in the commune in the year of 
observation. Data are available for 2004, 2006, and 2008. 
Irrigation 
Binary indicator of the presence of an irrigation system in the commune in the 
year observation. Data are available for 2004, 2006, and 2008.  
Clean Water 
Binary indicator of commune's access to clean water supply in the year of 
observation. Data are available for 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008.  
Marketplace 
Binary indicator of the presence of a market place in the commune in the year 
of observation. Data are available for 2004, 2006, and 2008.  
Aggregate Infrastructures 
Sum of commune's infrastructure dummies, including Clinic, Hospital, 
Preschool, Primary School, Middle School, High School, Electricity, Clean 
Water, Post Office, Cultural Center, Radio Station, Irrigation, Marketplace. Data 
are available for 2004, 2006, and 2008. 
Poor Commune Support 
Binary indicator of commune's inclusion into the State's "poor commune 
support program" in the year of observation. Data are available for 2002, 2004, 
2006, and 2008.  
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Infrastructures at District Level 
At district level, each outcome variable is the average of the corresponding 
commune-level variable, taken over all surveyed rural communes in the same year 
and district. 
Provincial Discretionary Policies (PDP) Score 
We construct a composite measure of provincial discretionary policies (PDP) 
using provincial governance indicators taken from the Vietnam Provincial 
Competitiveness Indices (PCI). The PCI is a set of indices of industries’ 
governance perceptions that has been systematically constructed from surveys of 
enterprises based in each province. It is the result of a country-wide project 
conducted since 2006 by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, with 
the help from the UNDP. The PDP score is calculated based on three indicators: 
(1) index of provincial leadership proactiveness, (2) index of the lack of informal 
costs to business, and (3) transparency score of the province. Specifically, PDP = 
(1) - (2) - (3), averaged over 2006 to 2008, the period during which the PCI 
overlaps with our dataset.  
Family Value Index (FVI) 
We construct a family value index (FVI) by summing the answers to two 
questions in the World Value Survey’s wave 4, 2001: (1) the importance of the 
family and (2) the importance of services to others. Data on those questions are 
only available for Vietnam in wave 4. The answers are added up, averaged and 
then ranked by region (the finest administrative information in the WVS). The 
above-median FVI regions (i.e. placing highest importance on family and service 
to others) are the Red River Delta, North East, and North Central. The others 
include North West, South Central, Central Highlands, South East and Mekong 
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River Delta (the median is computed over the effective sample of connections 
throughout the paper). 
II. A simple conceptual framework 
Existing economic theory has analyzed favoritism in auctions (Laffont and 
Tirole 1991, Burguet and Perry 2007), in the labor market (Prendergast and Topel 
1996, Duran and Morales 2011) and in queuing for public resources (Batabyal 
and Beladi 2008). Ethnicity (Burgess et al 2011), gender (Abrevaya and 
Hamermesh 2012) and social pressure (Garicano, Palacios and Prendergast 2005) 
have been considered as bases for favoritism. In this section, we present a simple 
model to illustrate how hometown-based favoritism works, and predict how 
officials’ power and motives shape the outcomes of this type of favoritism.  
The model involves a sequential game between two utility-maximizing agents, 
the Official and the Budget Allocator. 1  The Official corresponds to newly 
promoted officials with special links to their place of origin. The Allocator refers 
to the government unit that has authority over budget allocations to communes. 
The Official cares about getting additional resource allocation for his commune, 
which often comes in the form of additional budget infrastructure projects such as 
roads, markets, schools and clinics. These additional resources can benefit the 
Official in two ways: by providing him with additional political support from his 
home commune/district, as observed in the case of pork-barrel politics, and by 
appealing to his social preference to improve the welfare of his commune/district 
of origin and his remote relatives living there. This social preference is 
understood as an inherent cultural trait. Let λ denote the administrative level of 
the place of birth. λ can be commune, district or province. A higher λ means a 
larger administrative level, with more potential to provide political support but 
                                                 
1
 For expositional convenience, we refer to the official as male and the local authority as female.
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less social affection from the Official. The model allows for the comparison of 
different λ’s (commune versus district) to gain insight into the Official’s 
motivation. 
To achieve his objective, the Official has to work out a deal with the Allocator, 
who has direct control over budget allocation. The Official can give the Allocator 
certain favors, such as political promotion, that enhance the Allocator’s utility by 
P, at a cost g for the Official. In return, the Allocator will channel an additional 
amount B from the budget to the Official's hometown’s infrastructure projects, at 
a cost h for the Allocator. This favored allocation B is valued by the Official at 
(B,λ) + (B,λ), where  represents the utility from additional political support 
and  represents the utility from social preference satisfaction. We pay particular 
attention to B, as it manifests explicit evidence of favoritism between the Official 
and Allocator. 
We assume that the Official’s cost function g(P,r) is increasing and convex in P 
and decreasing in r, where r represents the Official's power such that higher r 
implies higher power. Next, the Allocator’s cost function h(B,d) is increasing and 
convex in B and increasing in d, where d measures institutional constraints on the 
Allocator's discretion. We further assume that (B,λ) and (B,λ) are both 
increasing and concave in B.2 
The Official is the first mover and makes an offer to the Allocator involving 
(P,B). The Allocator will accept if it satisfies her participation constraint, namely 
that the benefit of accepting is not lower than the cost. As the first mover, the 
Official can fully appropriate the game’s rent by making an offer such that the 
Allocator is indifferent as to whether to accept or refuse it. The offer then solves 
the following maximization problem: 
                                                 
2
 We assume that the costs of direct monetary transfers between the two agents are much higher than the costs of 
providing favor, so monetary transfers, or bribes, are not realistic options. In practice, exchanges of both bribes and favors 
may coexist. We refrain from modeling explicit bribes because it would not add insight to our empirical setup. 
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Max(P,B)  (B,λ) + (B,λ) - g(P, r) s.t. P - h(B,d)  0. (1) 
We will now state three propositions about the existence, distribution and 
motives of favoritism. These propositions provide the basis for the subsequent 
empirical investigation presented in this paper. 
Proposition 1: Assume that (A1): 'B(0,λ) + 'B(0,λ) - g'P(h(0,d),r)h'B(0,d) > 0. 
There exists a unique solution (P*,B*) to this model, with positive favored 
allocation B*>0, determined by the following equations: 
'B(B*,λ) + 'B(B*,λ) - g'P(h(B*,d),r)h'B(B*,d) = 0   (2), P* = h(B*,d). 
Intuitively, this proposition shows that if there is positive net marginal benefit 
of favored allocation B at 0, then a positive level of favoritism will occur. As a 
result, even in an authoritarian regime where the electoral motivation is absent, if 
the marginal social motivation is sufficiently large then favoritism will arise. 
(Proof in the Appendix) 
Proposition 2:  (a) Assume that (A2a) the marginal cost g'P is decreasing in r, 
then the favored allocation B* is increasing in r; (b) Assume that (A2b) the 
marginal cost h'B is increasing in d, then the favored allocation B* is decreasing in 
d. 
Result (a) implies that a higher-powered official can exercise more favoritism 
for his home commune. This relation allows us understand the power structure in 
a political system through observing the favoritism of different officials. Notice 
that what matters is the cross derivative of g with respect to P and r, and not the 
first derivative of g with respect to r. A higher-ranked official can get a better deal 
because P and r are complements. Result (b) implies that favoritism is more 
widespread when local authorities have more discretionary power to make a deal. 
(Proof in the Appendix) 
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Proposition 3: If the marginal benefits 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) are increasing 
(decreasing) in λ (A3), then the favored allocation B* is increasing (decreasing) in 
λ. 
This result shows that the effect of administrative level λ on the value of 
favored allocation essentially depends on its effect on the marginal benefits (Proof 
in the Appendix). As discussed previously, it is realistic to assume that at a larger 
administrative level, social preferences become less important and political 
motivation more important. At a larger level, social connections arguably become 
less frequent or salient, so the improved utility derived from more favored 
allocation is less valuable, i.e. 'B(B,λ) decreases when λ increases. On the other 
hand, a larger level is more politically influential, so additional favored allocation 
can potentially bring more benefit, i.e. 'B(B,λ) increases when λ increases. 
Overall, our prior on the effect of λ on the total marginal benefit, namely 'B(B,λ) 
+ 'B(B,λ), depends on whether social preferences or political influences are more 
dominant. Empirically, evidence that B* is increasing in λ is consistent with 
'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) being increasing in λ, in which case the social preference 
effect through 'B must have dominated the political motivation effect through 
'B.  
We can also consider the special case where the Official is the same as the 
Budget Allocator, political favor exchange becomes irrelevant and the Official 
only has to pick B to maximize his net gain of (B,λ) + (B,λ) - h(B,d). This 
problem has a unique solution B* that satisfies 'B(B*,λ) + 'B(B*,λ) - h'B(B*,d) = 
0 (as 'B(B,λ) and 'B(B,λ) are both decreasing in B while h'B(B,d) is increasing). 
As in propositions 2 and 3 above, this unique solution B* increases when d is 
lower (assuming that h'B is increasing in d) and when 'B(B,λ) is higher for every 
value of B. 
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This model provides a simple framework for understanding favoritism under 
various political systems, as previously examined in the existing scientific and 
journalistic literatures. In institutional environments with strong governance and 
high accountability, both g'P (the Official's marginal cost to grant political favor) 
and h'B (the Allocator's marginal cost to distort the local budget) are prohibitively 
high. The resulting amount of budget distorted by favoritism B* is then minimal, 
if at all. This applies to strong democracies as well as non-democratic regimes 
with a well-functioning system of checks and balances on the majority of 
officials, such as Singapore’s – the lack of political incentives in those regimes, 
i.e. low 'B, may further dampen favoritism. In effect, it suffices to raise either g'P 
or h'B, i.e. either the accountability of high-rank officials or that of local 
administrative units, to curb B*. 
The model also shows that while evidence of favoritism from heads of state 
such as Colonel Gaddafi or President Félix Houphouët-Boigny abound, it is 
unclear whether favoritism is widespread in these contexts. A strong dictator may 
only tolerate his own favoritism and punish his coordinates’; this is a case of g'P=0 
for the dictator, but very high for everyone else. In such cases, democratization 
and/or decentralization could increase ' and lower h'B, both leading to more 
widespread favoritism. For that reason, favoritism may also be found in 
democratic countries, such as in certain cases in the U.S. or India where the 
marginal cost g'P is low. 
The model’s application to an authoritarian setting yields key empirical 
predictions on the effects of officials’ promotions on home commune 
infrastructure, a manifestation of favored budget allocation. First, because of a 
lack of checks and balances, the marginal costs g'P and h'B are expected to be low 
in Vietnam, so the phenomenon of hometown favoritism is predicted to be 
widespread among officials, even beyond the top leaders (Hypothesis I). Second, 
hometown favoritism depends positively on the official’s power in the 
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authoritarian hierarchy and on the home province’s discretionary power 
(Hypothesis II). Third, hometown favoritism is most present where the 
attachment between the official and the hometown is strongest. We expect that the 
marginal social preference 'B is close to zero for communes aside from the home 
commune and that 'B for the home district is diluted to a much lower level than 
that of the home commune. Therefore, favoritism is predicted to decrease as we 
move from the home commune to neighboring communes or to the home district 
(Hypothesis III). While marginal political interest 'B may be slightly higher at 
the district level, we do not expect it in practice to be of a relevant magnitude (as 
districts barely matter in Vietnamese politics). The subsequent sections will 
present the data, empirical strategy and results of the tests of these three 
hypotheses. 
III. Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1: The Lagrangian of this optimization problem, (B,λ) + 
(B,λ) - g(P, r) - [P - h(B,d)], implies the first order conditions: 
'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) + h'B(B,d) = 0 and -g'P(P,r) -  = 0. 
The participation constraint is binding as P = h(B,d). 
These conditions yield: 
'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) - g'P(h(B,d),r)h'B(B,d) = 0. 
This equation has a unique solution B* because the left-hand side's derivative 
with respect to B is negative, as: 
''BB(B,λ) < 0, ''BB(B,λ) < 0, and g''PP(h(B,d),r)[h'B(B,d)]2 + 
g'P(h(B,d),r)h''B(B,d)  > 0. 
The Lagrangian is concave in (P,B) because its Hessian matrix is negative 
definite. Therefore, (h(B*,d),B*) is the unique solution to this optimization 
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problem under constraint. Furthermore, since the left-hand side of this equation is 
positive when B=0, the result of favored allocation B* must be positive (QED). 
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) The partial differentiation with respect to r from 
equation (2) yields: 
''BB(B*,λ)B*'r + ''BB(B*,λ)B*'r = 
[g''PP(P*,r)h'B(B*,d)B*'r  + g''Pr(P*,r)]h'B(B*,d) + g'P(P*,r)h''BB(B*,d)B*'r 
 {''BB(B*,λ) + ''BB(B*,λ) - g''PP(P*,r)[h'B(B*,d)]2 -  g'P(P*,r)h''BB(B*,d)}B*'r 
= g''Pr(P*,r)h'B(B*,d).     
The expression in the bracket on the left-hand side is negative while the right-
hand side is positive as g''Pr(P*,r) < 0 based on the proposition's assumption. 
Therefore, B*'r must be positive, indicating that the solution B* is increasing in r 
(QED). 
(b) The partial differentiation with respect to d from equation (2) yields: 
''BB(B*,λ)B*'d + ''BB(B*,λ)B*'d = 
g''PP(P*,r)[h'B(B*,d)B*'d + h'd(B*,d)]h'B(B*,d) + g'P(P*,r)[h''BB(B*,d)B*'d + 
h''Bd(B*,d)] 
 {''BB(B*,λ) + ''BB(B*,λ) - g''PP(P*,r)[h'B(B*,d)]2 - g'P(P*,r)h''BB(B*,d}B*'d 
= 
g''PP(P*,r)h'd(B*,d)h'B(B*,d) + g'P(P*,r)h''Bd(B*,d). 
The expression in the bracket on the left-hand side is negative while the right-
hand side is positive as h''Bd(B*,d) > 0 based on the proposition's assumption. 
Therefore, B*'d must be negative, indicating that the solution B* is decreasing in d 
(QED.) 
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose the marginal benefits are decreasing in λ, as in 
the case where social preferences outweigh political supports (the opposite case is 
proven analogously.) Let λ1 < λ2, so 'B(B,λ1) + 'B(B,λ1) ≥ 'B(B,λ2) + 'B(B,λ2) 
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for every B, and B1* and B2* be the corresponding solutions. We now need to 
show that B1* ≥ B2*. 
Recall from equation (2) that : 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) = g'P(h(B,d),r)h'B(B,d). 
Denote this expression as M(B). 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) is decreasing in B as + is 
concave in B, while M(B) is increasing in B as g and h are convex.  
Assume that B1* < B2*, then M(B1*) = 'B(B1*,λ1) + 'B(B1*,λ1) ≥ 'B(B1*,λ2) + 
'B(B1*,λ2) ≥ 'B(B2*,λ2) + 'B(B2*,λ2) = M(B2*), contradictory to M(B)’s 
increasing in B. Therefore, B1* ≥ B2* (QED). 
IV. Semi-parametric method used for Figure 1 
We modify the benchmark empirical regression in section IV.B to model the 
potentially heterogeneous effect of officials’ promotions on infrastructure 
improvements as a non-parametric function of a baseline variable (either 
commune average income per capita or population size), denoted as xc: 
Infrastructurecpt = β(xc)PowerCapitalp,t-L + γ(xc)Xcpt + δt(xc) + δcp(xc) + εcpt. 
Figure 1 plots the estimated function β(xc) in each specific case, based on the 
baseline variable and the outcome variable (either road quality or marketplaces.) 
The function β(xc) is estimated from semi-parametric local linear regressions of 
the outcome variable (local road quality or commune marketplace) at each value 
of xc, weighted by a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 10% of the total range 
of xc, on the treatment variable of Power Capital (with a two-year lag for presence 
of commune marketplaces), including with the controls and fixed effects in the 
benchmark regression. The observed pattern is much similar across a wide range 
of cross-validated bandwidths (see Li and Racine 2006, ch. 2.) To provide an 
example, in Figure 1’s first plot we divide the full range of the log of commune’s 
average income into a 100-point grid, run a local linear regression of village road 
quality on Power Capital with Gaussian kernel weight at each of these points, 
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using all controls and fixed effects in the benchmark regression in Table 2A, and 
then report the estimated coefficient of Power Capital as a point on the graph. 
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